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Abstract. An inequality measure is `consistent' if it ranks distribu-
tions the same irrespective of whether health quantities are represented
in terms of attainment or shortfalls. This consistency property severely
restricts the set of admissible inequality measures. We show that, within
a more general setting of separate measures for attainments and short-
falls, the consistency property is a combination of two conditions. The
rst is a compelling rationality condition that says that the attainment
measure should rank attainment distributions as the shortfall measure
ranks shortfall distributions. The second is an overly demanding con-
dition that says that the attainment measure and the shortfall measure
should be identical. By dropping the latter condition, the restrictions on
the admissible inequality measures disappear.
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1 Introduction
Clarke et al. (2002) have shown that conclusions drawn by standard in-
equality measures may dier depending on whether the individual health
data are represented by attainments or by shortfalls to an upper bound.
Observations like this have led Erreygers (2009a, 2009b), Lambert and
Zheng (2011) and Lasso de la Vega and Aristondo (2012), among oth-
ers, to search for `consistent' inequality measures, which rank attainment
distributions identically as the corresponding shortfall distributions. It
has been established that this property|to which we refer as `strong
consistency'|severely restricts the set of admissible inequality measures.
The following example illustrates the limitations imposed by strong
consistency. Consider the two-person attainment distributions x =
(10; 70) and y = (30; 90). With an upper bound of 100, the correspond-
ing shortfall distributions are x0 = (90; 30) and y0 = (70; 10), respectively.
Relative inequality measures, such as the well-known Gini and Theil mea-
sures, decrease under equal absolute additions for all individuals. Hence,
each relative inequality measure judges x as more unequal than y, but
x0 as less unequal than y0, and thus violates strong consistency. More-
over, the negative implications of strong consistency go much beyond
ruling out the relative inequality measures. For example, Lambert and
Zheng (2011) show that the variance is the only absolute and subgroup
decomposable inequality measure that satises strong consistency.
We will argue that strong consistency is unduly demanding. The
matter is important, as an appropriate weakening of the property turns
out to impose no a priori restrictions on the set of admissible inequality
measures.
First we focus on the implications of strong consistency. The prop-
erty aims to capture the rationality idea that inequality judgments should
not depend on the arbitrary choice of how to represent the basic data.
Therefore, strong consistency should not only apply to attainments and
shortfalls, but also to other representations. We show that consistency
with respect to one additional representation|in terms of `relative' short-
falls, which measure the proportional (instead of the absolute) increase
required to reach the upper bound|already excludes, among others, all
relative, absolute and intermediate inequality measures. That is, a direct
extension of the logic underlying strong consistency implies the impossi-
bility of inequality measurement using standard methods. This nding
encourages scrutinizing the property.
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In order to examine strong consistency, we consider a more general
setting that allows separate inequality measures for attainments and
shortfalls. We show that strong consistency is a combination of two
properties, viz., `weak consistency' and `uniqueness'. Weak consistency
says that the attainment measure should rank attainment distributions
in the same way as the shortfall measure ranks the corresponding short-
fall distributions. Uniqueness says that the attainment measure and the
shortfall measure should be identical. Weak consistency is sucient to
capture the desired rationality requirement, which means that uniqueness
is superuous and strong consistency is too demanding. We show that
if weak consistency is imposed without uniqueness, then any inequality
measure|without restrictions|can be chosen for either the attainment
or the shortfall measure. This choice then fully determines the properties
of the other measure.
The next section introduces notation and basic concepts. Section 3
considers the implications of strong consistency and of its underlying
logic. Section 4 examines strong consistency in the general setting with
separate attainment and shortfall measures. Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
A distribution is a vector x = (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) in Rn++. The positive
real number xi represents the health quantity|e.g., an attainment or a
shortfall|of individual i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. For a distribution x, we denote
the mean (x1 + x2 +    + xn)=n by x. We say that a distribution x is
non-equal if not all of the entries of x are equal. We write 1n for the
n-vector with a one at each entry.
An inequality measure is a symmetric and strictly Schur-convex func-
tion I : Rn++ ! R that associates with each distribution x in Rn++ an
inequality level I(x). Symmetry and strict Schur-convexity ensure that
the inequality measure is anonymous (switching individuals' quantities
does not change inequality) and satises the Pigou-Dalton principle (re-
gressive transfers between individuals increase inequality). These prop-
erties are standard in the literature (see, e.g., Cowell, 2000, and Lambert,
2001).
It is common to distinguish inequality measures with respect to their
behaviour under equal proportionate and equal absolute increases. We
distinguish the following ve categories.1
1Several terms are used in the literature to refer to the super-relative and super-
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(i) An inequality measure I is relative if I(x) = I(x) for each distri-
bution x and each  > 1.
(ii) An inequality measure I is absolute if I(x) = I(x + 1n) for each
distribution x and each  > 0.
(iii) An inequality measure I is intermediate if I(x + 1n) < I(x) <
I(x) for each non-equal distribution x, each  > 0 and each  > 1.
(iv) An inequality measure I is super-relative if I(x) > I(x) for each
non-equal distribution x and each  > 1.
(v) An inequality measure I is super-absolute if I(x) < I(x + 1n) for
each non-equal distribution x and each  > 0.
If I is a relative or super-relative inequality measure, then I(x) >
I(x + 1n) for each non-equal distribution x and each  > 0, and if
I is an absolute or super-absolute inequality measure, then I(x) < I(x)
for each non-equal distribution x and each  > 1 (see, e.g., Moyes, 1999,
Proposition 3.4).
Finally, let b be an upper bound on attainments and let B col-
lect each distribution x in Rn++ such that xi < b for each individual
i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. For a distribution x in B, we denote the distribution
(b   x1; b   x2; : : : ; b   xn) by b   x. If x is an attainment distribution,
then b   x is the corresponding shortfall distribution. Conversely, if x
is a shortfall distribution, then b   x is the corresponding attainment
distribution. The set B may be interpreted as the set of all attainment
distributions or, alternatively, as the set of all shortfall distributions.
3 Strong consistency and its implications
To address consistent comparisons of attainment and shortfall inequal-
ity, Erreygers (2009a) proposes the `perfect complementarity' property.
Perfect complementarity requires an inequality measure to take the same
value for an attainment distribution and its corresponding shortfall dis-
tribution. That is, it requires I(x) = I(b   x) for each distribution x in
B. For the income-related health inequality setting, which focuses mainly
on variants and extensions of the concentration index and concentration
curve, Erreygers (2009b) introduced the analogous `mirror condition'.
absolute categories. For example, Amiel and Cowell (1999) use the terms `Dalton' and
`anti-Dalton', Kolm (1999) uses `superintensive' and `superequal', and Zheng (2007)
uses `extreme rightist' and `extreme leftist'.
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Lambert and Zheng (2011) propose a less demanding consistency
property. They require only that an inequality measure's ranking of
two attainment distributions coincides with its ranking of the two corre-
sponding shortfall distributions. We focus on the property of Lambert
and Zheng and refer to it as strong consistency.
Strong consistency. For all distributions x and y in B, we have
I(x)  I(y) if and only if I(b  x)  I(b  y).
Clearly, each inequality measure that satises perfect complementar-
ity also satises strong consistency. Therefore, our critique of strong con-
sistency applies also to perfect complementarity (and to the analogous
mirror condition).
Strong consistency severely restricts the set of admissible inequality
measures. Several contributions to the literature argue that the property
suggests an exclusive focus on absolute inequality measures. Lambert
and Zheng (2011, Theorem 3) show that among relative, absolute and
(a subclass of the) intermediate inequality measures, only absolute in-
equality measures can satisfy strong consistency. Similarly, Erreygers
and Van Ourti (2011a) show that absolute variants of the concentration
index satisfy the mirror condition, whereas relative variants do not. This
nding also gures prominently in the debate between Wagsta (2011a,
2011b) and Erreygers and Van Ourti (2011b). Particular absolute in-
equality measures satisfying perfect complementarity or the mirror con-
dition have been proposed by Erreygers (2009a, 2009b) and Chakravarty
et al. (2013).
The following proposition generalizes the incompatibility result of
Lambert and Zheng (2011, Theorem 3) to all relative, intermediate,2
super-relative and super-absolute inequality measures. The proof relies
on a simple extension of the two-person example presented in the intro-
duction.
Proposition 1. There is no relative, intermediate, super-relative or
super-absolute inequality measure that satises strong consistency.
2Theorem 3 of Lambert and Zheng (2011) covers only the intermediate inequality
measures that satisfy Zoli's (1999) `exible inequality equivalence' property. Excluded,
for example, is the class of intermediate inequality measures introduced by Seidl
and Pngsten (1997). Proposition 1, by contrast, covers all intermediate inequality
measures.
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Proof. Let b be the upper bound on attainments. Let c, d and e be
positive real numbers such that c + d + e < b. Consider two attainment
distributions x = (c; c; : : : ; c; c+d) and y = (c+e; c+e; : : : ; c+e; c+d+e).
The shortfall distributions are b x = (b c; b c; : : : ; b c; b c d) and
b  y = (b  c  e; b  c  e; : : : ; b  c  e; b  c  d  e). For each relative,
each intermediate and each super-relative inequality measure I, we have
I(x) > I(y) and I(b  x) < I(b  y). For each super-absolute inequality
measure, we have I(x) < I(y) and I(b   x) > I(b   y). Hence, each
relative, each intermediate, each super-relative and each super-absolute
inequality measure violates strong consistency.
Two comments are in order. First, not all absolute inequality mea-
sures satisfy strong consistency. Lambert and Zheng (2011, Theorems 4,
5 and 6) identify several demanding additional conditions. Erreygers et
al. (2012) provide related results in the income-related health inequality
setting. Second, not all inequality measures that satisfy strong consis-
tency are absolute. Lasso de la Vega and Aristondo (2012) and Aris-
tondo and Lasso de la Vega (2014) suggest two procedures to construct
an inequality measure that satises perfect complementarity.3 The con-
structed inequality measure is typically not absolute, but rather forms
a compromise between the ve categories of relative, absolute, interme-
diate, super-relative and super-absolute inequality measures. Kjellsson
and Gerdtham (2013) and Allanson and Petrie (2014) demonstrate that
Wagsta's (2005) variant of the concentration index|a non-absolute in-
equality measures that satises the mirror condition|is a compromise
between the relative and super-absolute categories.4 The compromise
position has been examined further by Kjellsson and Gerdtham (2014).
Proposition 1, together with previous results in the literature, demon-
strates that strong consistency rules out many interesting inequality mea-
sures. This motivates putting the property under scrutiny. In the next
section we will argue that strong consistency is too demanding and that
3Both procedures focus simultaneously on the attainment distribution and the cor-
responding shortfall distribution. The rst procedure applies a generalized mean to a
given inequality measure's values for the attainment and shortfall distributions (Lasso
de la Vega and Aristondo, 2012). The second procedure applies a given inequality
measure to the distribution obtained by concatenation of the attainment and shortfall
distributions (Aristondo and Lasso de la Vega, 2014).
4This is noted also by Erreygers and Van Ourti (2011a, p. 690). However, they
regard super-absoluteness, to which they refer as `inverse-relativeness', as unreason-
able.
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a proper weakening allows complete freedom in choosing inequality mea-
sures. But rst we look at the implication of extending the logic of strong
consistency to a third representation of the basic data.
Consider a representation of a distribution in terms of `relative' short-
falls. Whereas the shortfall distribution looks at the absolute amount
that has to be added to an attainment to reach the upper bound, the
relative shortfall distribution looks at the factor by which the attainment
has to be multiplied in order to reach the upper bound. For a distribu-
tion x in B, we denote the distribution (b=x1; b=x2; : : : ; b=xn) by b=x. If
x is an attainment distribution, then b=x is the corresponding relative
shortfall distribution (and vice versa).
The following property applies the logic of strong consistency to rel-
ative shortfalls. It requires the inequality rankings of attainment distri-
butions and the corresponding relative shortfall distributions to be the
same.
Strong consistency. For all distributions x and y in B, we have
I(x)  I(y) if and only if I(b=x)  I(b=y).
The next proposition is a counterpart to Proposition 1. The propo-
sition says that strong consistency excludes all absolute, intermediate,
super-relative and super-absolute inequality measures.5
Proposition 2. There is no absolute, intermediate, super-relative or
super-absolute inequality measure that satises strong consistency.
Proof. Let b be the upper bound on attainments. Let c > 0, d > 1
and e > 1 be real numbers such that cde < b. Consider two attainment
distributions x = (c; c; : : : ; c; cd) and y = (ce; ce; : : : ; ce; cde). The rela-
tive shortfall distributions are b=x = (b=c; b=c; : : : ; b=c; b=(cd)) and b=y =
(b=(ce); b=(ce); : : : ; b=(ce); c=(cde)). For each absolute, each intermediate
and each super-absolute inequality measure I, we have I(x) < I(y) and
I(b=x) > I(b=y). For each super-relative inequality measure I, we have
I(x) > I(y) and I(b=x) < I(b=y). Hence, each absolute, each inter-
mediate, each super-relative and each super-absolute inequality measure
violates strong consistency*.
5An example of a relative inequality measure that satises strong consistency* is
x 7!  0:5 +Pni=1 x=(2nxi). This inequality measure is a member of the generalized
entropy class: consider equation (5.12a) in Lambert (2001) and set c =  1.
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The rationality idea underlying strong consistency requires that the
inequality ranking should be the same irrespective of whether the basic
data is represented in terms of attainments, (absolute) shortfalls, relative
shortfalls, or in any other way. That is, if strong consistency is accepted as
a compelling rationality requirement, then so should strong consistency.6
But as the following immediate implication of Propositions 1 and 2 shows,
this leads to the impossibility of inequality measurement using standard
methods.
Corollary. There is no relative, absolute, intermediate, super-relative
or super-absolute inequality measure that satises both strong consistency
and strong consistency.
We have looked at the severe implications for inequality measurement
of strong consistency and of extending the property's underlying logic.
Now we turn to a direct examination of strong consistency.
4 Disentangling strong consistency
We consider a more general setting that allows for separate inequality
measures for attainments and shortfalls. Thus, we recognize that a priori
one may want dierent properties for an inequality measure depending
on what the numbers to which it applies actually mean (e.g., one may
want the Pigou-Dalton principle if the numbers are incomes, but not if
the numbers are logged incomes).7 We denote the attainment inequality
measure by Ia and the shortfall inequality measure by Is. Note that the
previous setting with a single measure I for attainments and shortfalls
is obtained as a special case by imposing the condition Ia = Is (= I).
We discuss this condition (the `uniqueness' property) at the end of this
section.
A pair of inequality measures (Ia; Is) consistently compares attain-
ment and shortfall inequality if it satises the following property.
Weak consistency. For all distributions x and y in B, we have
Ia(x)  Ia(y) if and only if Is(b  x)  Is(b  y).
6For our purpose it is irrelevant whether or not relative shortfalls are used in prac-
tice. All that matters is that relative shortfalls constitute another way of representing
the same basic data.
7Marchant (2008) stresses this point in the context of currency unit consistency
for bankruptcy rules.
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Weak consistency is sucient to guarantee that inequality judgments
do not depend on whether the data are represented in terms of attain-
ments or shortfalls. Moreover, it does the job without the two negative
implications of strong consistency that were identied in the previous
section. To see this, consider the following proposition (of which we omit
the simple proof).
Proposition 3. A pair of inequality measures (Ia; Is) satises weak
consistency if and only if there exists a strictly increasing function f :
R! R such that
Ia(x) = f(Is(b  x)) for each distribution x in B. (1)
First, in contrast to strong consistency (recall Proposition 1 in Section
3), weak consistency imposes no restrictions on the set of admissible
inequality measures. Let the attainment measure Ia be any inequality
measure (including those excluded by Proposition 1). If the shortfall
inequality measure Is is dened in accordance with equation (1), then
the pair (Ia; Is) satises weak consistency. Conversely, weak consistency
allows any inequality measure to serve as the shortfall measure Is, as
long as the attainment measure Ia is dened as in equation (1).
As an example, consider the Gini measure,
G : B  ! R : x 7 ! 1
2n2x
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
jxi   xjj . (2)
The Gini measure is relative and hence excluded by strong consistency.
By contrast, weak consistency does allow choosing the Gini measure as,
say, the attainment measure Ia, provided that we dene the shortfall
measure Is in accordance with equation (1). That is, Is must be equal
to (an increasing transformation of)
H : B  ! R : x 7 ! 1
2n2(b  x)
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
jxi   xjj . (3)
So, B in equation (2) is the set of all attainment distributions, whereas
B in equation (3) is the set of all shortfall distributions. The inequality
measures G and H each violate strong consistency, but the pair (G;H)
satises weak consistency.8
8The measure G is relative, whereas the measure H is super-absolute. This obser-
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Second, contrary to strong consistency (recall the corollary in Section
3), weak consistency does not become more restrictive if extended to addi-
tional representations of the data. Consider a general ` -representation'
that transforms each attainment using a strictly monotonic function
 : B ! R++. For an attainment distribution x in B, we denote the
corresponding ` -distribution' ( (x1);  (x2); : : : ;  (xn)) by  (x). For ex-
ample, we have  (x) = b  x in the case of shortfalls and  (x) = b=x in
the case of relative shortfalls. Consider an attainment measure Ia and a
measure I dened by
Ia(x) = f(I ( (x))) for each distribution x in B,
with f a strictly increasing function. We have that Ia ranks attain-
ment distributions in the same way as I ranks the corresponding  -
distributions. Clearly, weak consistency can be extended without impos-
ing additional restrictions on inequality measures: the inequality measure
for, say, attainments may be chosen freely, and this choice fully deter-
mines the inequality measure for each  -representation.9
We conclude this section by clarifying the relationship between weak
consistency and strong consistency. The following property on a pair of
inequality measures (Ia; Is) says that there should be a unique inequality
measure to deal with both attainment and shortfall distributions.
Uniqueness. The inequality measures Ia and Is are identical.
As shown by the next proposition (of which we omit the easy proof),
strong consistency coincides with the combination of weak consistency
and uniqueness.
Proposition 4. A pair of inequality measures (Ia; Is) satises weak con-
sistency and uniqueness if and only if there exists an inequality measure
I = Ia = Is that satises strong consistency.
vation generalizes to each pair of inequality measures that satises weak consistency:
if one of the two inequality measures is relative, then the other is super-absolute. Note
that, by contrast, some other key properties carry over from one of the two inequality
measures to the other: for example, if one of the two inequality measures satises
the Pigou-Dalton principle, then so does the other, and if one of the two inequality
measures satises subgroup decomposability (see Lambert, 2001, pp. 111-112, for a
formal denition), then so does the other (after a strictly increasing transformation).
9It should not be seen as a limitation that the inequality measures for all other
representations are fully determined. Indeed, the rationality idea we aim to capture
requires exactly that nothing remains to be said after xing the inequality measure
for one particular representation of the data.
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Weak consistency already ensures that inequality judgments do not
depend on the chosen representation of the data. Therefore, we conclude
that uniqueness is superuous and strong consistency is too demanding.
Given that uniqueness is not required for consistent inequality judg-
ments, the question arises whether there are alternative justications for
the property. A plausible response would be that uniqueness is a prop-
erty of convenience. It is indeed convenient not having to change the
inequality measure if the representation of the data changes. However,
this convenience comes at too high a cost: the propositions and corollary
in Section 3, for example, demonstrate the severely restricting implica-
tions of adding uniqueness to weak consistency.10
For an alternative possible justication of uniqueness, consider the
following scenario. A practitioner possesses all the data needed for a
particular inequality analysis. However, she does not posses the infor-
mation on whether these data are represented in terms of attainments or
in terms of shortfalls. Uniqueness is compelling in this scenario, as it is
impossible to determine whether the attainment measure or the shortfall
measure should be used. But the scenario is without any practical rele-
vance: precise information on how the data are represented is virtually
always available in practice.
The above scenario does, however, present another way of seeing why
strong consistency is too demanding. Weak consistency allows use of
the information on whether numbers express attainments or shortfalls in
making consistent inequality judgments. Strong consistency|by addi-
tionally imposing uniqueness|disallows use of this information. But as
this information is readily available, a ban on its use is uncalled for.
Interestingly, although the literature does not explicitly discuss unique-
ness, some recent studies can be interpreted as being critical of the prop-
erty. Allanson and Petrie (2013, 2014) and Kjellsson and Gerdtham
(2014) stress that a relative inequality measure dened on the domain
of attainment distributions expresses fundamentally dierent inequality
judgments than the same relative inequality measure dened on the do-
main of shortfall distributions. In other words, to describe one's judg-
ments on how to make inequality comparisons it does not suce to state
the chosen inequality measure. Rather, one must state also the particular
representation of the data (such as attainments or shortfalls) to which the
10As Kolm (1976, p. 420) puts it forcefully in the similar context of consistency with
respect to dierent currency units, \convenience could not be an alibi for endorsing
injustice".
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inequality measure is applied. This is of course tantamount to a rejection
of uniqueness.
5 Conclusion
Consistent comparisons of attainment and shortfall inequality may be
implemented using a condition on a single inequality measure, or using
a condition on a pair of inequality measures, one measure for attain-
ments and one for shortfalls. The former approach, embodied by strong
consistency, severely restricts the set of admissible inequality measures.
The latter approach, embodied by weak consistency, does not lead to any
restrictions. The literature has taken the former approach, whereas we
have advocated the latter.
Strong consistency is equivalent to the combination of weak consis-
tency and uniqueness. The latter property says that the inequality mea-
sures used for attainments and shortfalls should be the same. We have
argued that the uniqueness property is not compelling. Uniqueness may
be regarded as convenient, but this convenience comes at the high cost
of ruling out perfectly valid classes of inequality measures.
References
Allanson P and D Petrie, 2013. On the choice of health inequality measure for the
longitudinal analysis of income-related health inequalities. Health Economics
22, 353-365.
Allanson P and D Petrie, 2014. Understanding the vertical equity judgements under-
pinning health inequality measures. Health Economics 23, 1390-1396.
Amiel Y and FA Cowell, 1999. Income transformations and income inequality. In:
D Slottje (ed), Advances in Econometrics, Income Distribution and Scientic
Methodology. Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, 209-232.
Aristondo O and C Lasso de la Vega, 2014. Measuring the inequality of bounded dis-
tributions: A joint analysis of attainments and shortfalls. In: P Rosa Dias and
O O'Donnell (eds), Health and Inequality (Research on Economic Inequality,
vol. 21). Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 33-52.
Chakravarty SR, N Chattopadhyay and C D'Ambrosio, 2013. On a family of achieve-
ment and shortfall inequality indices. ECINEQ Working Paper 2013-300.
Clarke PM, U-G Gerdtham, M Johannesson, K Bingefors and L Smith, 2002. On the
measurement of relative and absolute income-related health inequality. Social
Science & Medicine 55, 1923-1928.
Cowell FA, 2000. Measurement of inequality. In: A Atkinson and F Bourguignon
(eds), Handbook of Income Distribution I. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 87-166.
12
Erreygers G, 2009a. Can a single indicator measure both attainment and shortfall
inequality? Journal of Health Economics 28, 885-893.
Erreygers G, 2009b. Correcting the concentration index. Journal of Health Economics
28, 504-515.
Erreygers G, P Clarke, T Van Ourti, 2012. \Mirror, mirror, on the wall, who in
this land is fairest of all?"{Distributional sensitivity in the measurement of
socioeconomic inequality of health. Journal of Health Economics 31, 257-270.
Erreygers G and T Van Ourti, 2011a. Measuring socioeconomic inequality in health,
health care and health nancing by means of rank-dependent indices: a recipe
for good practice. Journal of Health Economics 30, 685-694.
Erreygers G and T Van Ourti, 2011b. Putting the cart before the horse. A comment
on Wagsta on inequality measurement in the presence of binary variables.
Health Economics 20, 1161-1165.
Kjellsson G and U-G Gerdtham, 2013. On correcting the concentration index for
binary variables. Journal of Health Economics 32, 659-670.
Kjellsson G and U-G Gerdtham, 2014. Lost in translation: Rethinking the inequality
equivalence criteria for bounded health variables. In: P Rosa Dias and O
O'Donnell (eds), Health and Inequality (Research on Economic Inequality, vol.
21). Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 3-32.
Kolm S-C, 1976. Unequal inequalities I. Journal of Economic Theory 12, 416-442.
Kolm S-C, 1999. The rational foundations of income inequality measurement. In: J
Silber (ed), Handbook of Income Inequality Measurement. Dordrecht: Kluwer,
19-100.
Lambert P, 2001. The Distribution and Redistribution of Income: A Mathematical
Analysis. Third edition. Manchester: Manchester University Press
Lambert P and B Zheng, 2011. On the consistent measurement of attainment and
shortfall inequality. Journal of Health Economics 30, 214-219.
Lasso de la Vega C and O Aristondo, 2012. Proposing indicators to measure achieve-
ment and shortfall inequality consistently. Journal of Health Economics 31,
578-583.
Marchant T, 2008. Scale invariance and similar invariance conditions for bankruptcy
problems. Social Choice and Welfare 31, 693-707.
Moyes P, 1999. Stochastic dominance and the Lorenz curve. In: J Silber (ed),
Handbook of Income Inequality Measurement. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 199-222.
Seidl C and A Pngsten, 1997. Ray invariant inequality measures. In: S Zandvakili
(ed), Research on Economic Inequality, vol. 7. Greenwich: JAI Press, 107-129.
Wagsta A, 2005. The bounds of the concentration index when the variable of interest
is binary, with an application to immunization inequality. Health Economics
14, 429-432.
Wagsta A, 2011a. The concentration index of a binary outcome revisited. Health
Economics 20, 1155-1160.
Wagsta A, 2011b. Reply to Guido Erreygers and Tom Van Ourti's comment on
`The concentration index of a binary outcome revisited'. Health Economics
20, 1166-1168.
13
Zheng B, 2007. Unit-consistent decomposable inequality measures. Economica 74,
97111.
Zoli C, 1999. A generalized version of the inequality equivalence criterion: a sur-
plus sharing characterization, complete and partial orderings. In: H de Swart
(ed), Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice: Proceedings of the International
Conference LGS'99. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 427-441.
14
